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The relationship between income inequality and national savings is theoretically 
ambiguous, and past empirical studies have delivered mixed results. We revisit the 
question using a newly available source of data on inequality: the income share of the 
richest 10 percent and the richest 1 percent. Combining this with historical data on 
national savings rates, we are able to investigate the relationship for eleven developed 
countries over the period 1921-2002. We find no consistent relationship between 
lagged top income shares and current savings rates, and our standard errors are small 
enough that we are able to reject more than modest effects in either direction. We 
view this as suggesting that inequality at the top end of the distribution is not a major 
driver of national savings rates. 
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The effect of economic inequality on the savings rate is an issue that has interested 
economists for at least half a century. Yet theory and empirics have produced mixed 
predictions and results. Some have argued that inequality should boost savings. According to 
Kaldor (1957), inequality should have a positive effect on savings if the rich have a higher 
marginal propensity to save than the poor. Similarly, Friedman (1957) suggested that those 
with higher current income save more than their lower income counterparts in order to 
compensate for lower income in the future. Under this framework, short-run fluctuations in 
inequality should also lead to higher savings.  
 
Conversely, Alesina and Rodrik (1996) have shown that if higher inequality leads to higher 
taxation (for redistributive purposes), then inequality will lower aggregate savings. In 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), they have also demonstrated that if inequality is associated with 
socio-political instability, it is likely to reduce investment confidence, and therefore lower the 
savings rate. Similarly, Aghion et al. (1999) have shown that in the presence of capital-
market imperfections and decreasing returns to individual investments, greater inequality 
results in lower aggregate savings and investment. This is because the marginal productivity 
of investment by the rich is relatively lower than investment by the poor, and higher 
inequality means less investment by the poor.  A posited link between inequality and savings 
has been suggested as one channel through which inequality might affect growth (see e.g.  
Voitchovsky, 2009). 
 
Two studies which focus on the cross-country relationship between inequality and savings 
have found that the two variables are positively related. Using data for 49 developing  2
countries in the 1970s and 1980s, Cook (1995) found a positive relationship between 
inequality (measured as the top 5 percent share, the top 10 percent share, the bottom 40 
percent share, or the  Gini coefficient) and gross domestic savings. Similarly, Hong (1995) 
found a positive relationship between the top 20 percent share and saving rates in a cross-
country sample of 64 developing and developed countries, using 1960–1985 averages for 
each country.  
 
However, studies using panel data have tended not to find a relationship between savings and 
inequality. Using panel data for 11 developed and 25 developing countries from 1970–1992, 
Edwards (1996) showed that inequality (defined as the ratio of income received by the 
bottom 40 percent over income received by the top 10 percent) is not significantly related to 
private savings. Similarly, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000), using a panel of 19 developed 
and 33 developing countries, did not find support for the notion that the Gini coefficient has 
any effect on gross national savings. Their results were robust to various specifications, 
including a fixed effects model for 27 countries during this period.  
 
A closely related literature compares individuals within the United States, seeking to 
determine whether people with higher lifetime incomes have higher savings rates. This has 
direct implications for our research. If the rich save more than the poor, then a mean-
preserving transfer from poor to rich would raise aggregate savings rates. However, research 
on this topic has not always arrived at the same conclusion. Using interview and survey data 
for the United States covering the period 1960–1987, Bunting (1991) found evidence of a 
positive effect of household income inequality on savings. Similarly, using two-stage panel 
data techniques for the United States covering the years 1983–1989, Dynan et al. (2004) 
found a strong positive relationship between personal savings rates and lifetime income.  3
However, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) and Venti and Wise (2001) used survey data on 
individuals approximating retirement age in the United States and found no correlation 
between wealth and savings.  
 
The empirical literature does not show a clear picture of the relationship between savings and 
inequality. These conflicting results are partly explained by different functional forms, data 
coverage, and time periods. Another factor in cross-national regressions is the quality of the 
income distribution data, which is often drawn from sources that are not directly comparable.  
 
To address these limitations, we present new empirical evidence on the relationship between 
top-end inequality and the savings rate, using as our measure of inequality top incomes data 
for 11 developed nations: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. To preview the results, we find no 
statistically significant impact of top incomes on savings. Our results are also economically 
insignificant; allowing us to reject large impacts of top incomes on the aggregate savings 
rate. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the data employed. 
Section 3 presents the statistical model and results. Section 4 presents several robustness 




Most existing studies of the relationship between savings and inequality have used income 
distribution data from the Deininger and Squire database (Deininger and Squire, 1996).  4
However, as Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) have shown, results based on this dataset can be 
fragile since it combines inequality measures that differ in the choice of reference group 
(individual, family, or household), in the type of inequality being measured (income or 
expenditure), and in the adjustments that are made for family size and the impact of income 
taxation. An alternative is to rely upon a smaller but more comparable inequality dataset, 
such as the Luxembourg Income Study. However, the relatively small number of 
observations in this dataset significantly reduces the precision with which one is able to 
estimate within-country changes. Moreover, even using surveys that are relatively 
comparable, one is left with the problem that survey data tends to undersample high earners 
(Moore et al., 2000). If what matters for savings is income inequality at the very top of the 
distribution, then survey data may not fully capture the variation across countries and over 
time. 
 
We therefore opt to use data on the share of national income held by top groups – specifically 
the richest 10 percent and the richest 1 percent. Our data are drawn from 11 studies that have 
estimated top income shares by combining taxation statistics with external control totals for 
the total population and personal income. Leigh (2007) makes some minor adjustments to 
improve the comparability of these series: averaging across years where the tax year does not 
correspond to the calendar year, adjusting for series breaks, and linearly interpolating breaks 
of four years or less. We use this dataset in our analysis.
1  
 
                                                 
1 The original sources are Alvaredo and Saez (2006); Atkinson (2007); Atkinson and Leigh (2007); Dell (2007); 
Dell et al. (2007); Nolan (2007); Piketty (2007); Piketty and Saez (2006b); Roine and Waldenström (2006); 
Saez and Veall (2005); Salverda and Atkinson (2007). Leigh (2007) also uses data for Japan and New Zealand. 
We exclude Japan, since data are not available for the top 10 percent. An important control variable for our 
purposes is the interest rate. Because the dataset from which we source historical financial returns does not 
include New Zealand, we drop that country from our analysis as well.  5
Naturally, the top incomes series are still not perfectly comparable. One problem is that the 
income unit differs, since married couples file taxes jointly in some countries and separately 
in others. Complicating matters still further, two countries in our sample (Sweden and the 
United Kingdom) switched from joint to individual filing. This did not appear to have a 
substantial impact on the Swedish series, but the United Kingdom series is adjusted to 
account for this switch. Another issue is the treatment of capital gains. Where possible, our 
series exclude capital gains, on the basis that the timing of capital gains realizations is largely 
discretionary. However, it was not possible to fully separate capital gains for Australia and 
the United Kingdom. Partly for these reasons, all of our regressions include country fixed 
effects. 
 
Our adjusted top incomes data cover the period 1921-2002. Although there are some gaps, 
the final sample (i.e. the number of country-year observations on inequality and savings) is 
extremely large. For example, when we estimate our regressions using annual data, we have 
547 observations on the top 1 percent, and 501 observations on the top 10 percent. Compared 
with previous studies on inequality and savings, this gives us significantly more degrees of 
freedom. For instance, our sample size is approximately twice as large as the sample used by 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000). 
 
Several existing studies (see e.g. Edwards, 1996) have noted that since most theories about 
savings and inequality relate to household behavior, an ideal measure of savings would be 
based on household surveys. However, due to data limitations, such measures are available 
only for a few countries, and over a short time span.
2 We opt instead to focus on the 
aggregate savings rate, incorporating private and government savings. This accords with 
                                                 
2 Measures of savings based on household surveys, such as the United States Survey of Consumer Finances, are 
extremely complicated to administer (not least because they require oversampling the rich), and are therefore 
only available for a small number of years.   6
most previous studies in the cross-country literature, which have used national savings. In 
addition, as Alesina and Rodrik (1994) point out, the aggregate savings rate is plausibly of 
greater policy interest, since it is a measure of the total amount of savings available in the 
economy.
3  However, we also investigate the robustness of our results to using household 
savings as the dependent variable. 
 
Our savings data are drawn from two sources. Over the period 1921 to 1992, we are fortunate 
to be able to rely upon an extensive dataset of savings rates compiled by Taylor (2002). Until 
1959, Taylor’s savings rate is calculated via the current account identity, as the investment 
rate plus the ratio of the current account to GDP. From 1960 onwards, Taylor’s estimates are 
taken from World Bank (1994). Over the period 1993 to 2002, we use savings data from the 
OECD Economic Outlook database (2006). Over the period 1986 to 1992, we have data from 
Taylor (2002) and the OECD (2006), and do not observe any systematic divergence. 
(Overall, the mean absolute difference between the two sources is just 1 percentage point.)  
 
In our preferred specifications, we include three controls. Since the level of income may 
affect the savings rate, we control for log GDP per capita in real Geary-Khamis dollars, 
sourced from Maddison (2003, 2007). Given that individuals’ savings patterns tend to change 
across the lifecycle, we control for the dependency ratio, being the ratio of the population 
aged under 15 and over 64 to the rest of the population (see Deaton, 1992, for a discussion of 
the relationship between the age structure and the savings rate). Also, since the interest rate 
may affect the savings rate, we control for the real return on bonds in local currency, sourced 
from Dimson et al. (2002). Below, we also investigate the robustness of our results to adding 
                                                 
3 Another complication is that, as Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) point out, it is preferable to calculate the 
savings rate as a ratio of GNP rather than GDP, since GDP excludes net income from abroad (and is therefore 
closer to the income concept relevant for agents’ consumption and saving decisions). Unfortunately, both our 
data sources use GDP as the denominator. In practice, the GDP-GNP gap for most developed nations is quite 
small (see e.g. MacKellar and Reisen. 1998).  7
further controls. The Data Appendix contains summary statistics, as well as more detail on 
the derivation of our variables and their sources.   
 
To give some sense of the patterns in the data, Figure 1 plots the income share of the richest 
10 percent against gross savings, while Figure 2 plots the income share of the top 1 percent 
against gross savings. In the top incomes series, two patterns are readily discernable. In the 
five English-speaking countries for which we have data back to World War I, top incomes 
followed a U-shaped pattern over the twentieth century, whereas in continental European 
nations (except Switzerland), the two world wars coincided with sharp falls in top income 
shares.  
 
 It is more difficult to discern long-run trends in the savings series, which are more volatile 
from year to year than the top incomes series. In most countries, savings rates rose slightly 
over the course of the twentieth century, but the increase was fairly small. Looking at the 
relationship between top incomes and savings, the associations do not seem to go in any 
consistent direction, with the data suggesting a positive relationship in France and Ireland, a 
negative relationship in the Netherlands and the United States, and no relationship in the 
other countries. Overall, there are no consistent associations between inequality and savings 
in Figures 1 and 2. However, inter-ocular impact tests do not account for potentially 
confounding variables such as income levels and age structures. We therefore turn to testing 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. Empirical Findings 
 
The empirical model in this study involves estimating a savings equation which provides for 
capturing the impact of income inequality on household savings. This can be analyzed using 
the following equation:  
          it t i t i it t i it Z Z S ε λ α β β η β + + + + + = − − 1 , 3 2 1 , 1 ' '                (1) 
where  it S  refers to the gross national savings rate of country i at time t, ηi,t-1 is inequality in 
the previous period,  it Z  and  1 , − t i Z are vectors of time-varying country characteristics in the 
current and previous period, αi is a country fixed effect, λt is a year fixed effect, and εit is a 
normally-distributed mean-zero error term.  
 
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), standard errors are clustered by country. This allows for 
arbitrary error correlations among country-year observations within each country, which 
specifies standard errors that are asymptotically robust to serial correlation.  
 
Our results focus on two measures of inequality: the income share of the richest 10 percent, 
and the income share of the richest 1 percent. To ensure that our results are capturing the 
effect of inequality on savings (rather than the reverse), we regress the current year’s savings 
rate on the past inequality. We use three lags – one year, five years, and ten years. Following 
convention, the five-year lag specification only uses observations from years divisible by 
five; and the ten-year lag specification only uses observations from years divisible by ten 
(using all available observations makes little difference to the results). Since the interest rate 
may be endogenous with respect to the supply of savings, we show results both with and 
without an interest rate control.  
  11
We begin by showing results without country and year fixed effects. Although it is not our 
preferred specification, it is useful to see results without fixed effects, since some of the 
previous studies on this topic have used only cross-country variation. Panel A of Table 1 
shows that, for the full sample (1921-2002), the results without fixed effects suggest a strong 
negative effect of past inequality on current savings rates: in this specification, a one 
percentage point increase in top income shares is associated with a 0.3 to 0.6 percentage 
point drop in the savings rate.  
 
The other two panels of Table 1 show results with country and year fixed effects. The 
rationale for country fixed effects is that they account for time-invariant country 
characteristics such as a country’s relative size, its distance to major markets, and social 
norms about saving. Year fixed effects are intended to capture time shocks that are common 
to all countries, such as world wars, global economic cycles, and technological changes that 
affect cross-border capital flows in all developed nations. 
 
Once country and year fixed effects are included, then either without the interest rate control 
(Panel B) or with the interest rate control (Panel C), our results show no significant effect of 
past inequality on the current savings rate. This is true regardless of whether we focus on the 
top 10 percent or the top 1 percent as our measure of inequality, and whether we use one-
year, five-year, or ten-year lags. Clearly, the pooled OLS results are not robust to including 





Table 1: Inequality and Savings, 1921-2002 
Dependent variable is the gross national savings rate 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lag: T-1 T-5 T-10 
Measure:  Top 10%  Top 1%  Top 10% Top 1%  Top 10%  Top 1% 
Panel A: Without country and year fixed effects 
Inequality  -0.369*  -0.600** -0.409  -0.543 -0.337** -0.311 
  [0.167] [0.244] [0.227] [0.426] [0.137] [0.360] 
Observations  501  547 94 104 46  51 
R-squared  0.15 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.18 
Panel B: With fixed effects, without interest rate controls 
Inequality  0.177 0.05 -0.061  0.159  0.009 0.27 
  [0.177] [0.257] [0.110] [0.359] [0.331] [0.552] 
Observations  501  547 94 104 46  51 
R-squared  0.7  0.71 0.73 0.71 0.78 0.81 
Panel C: With fixed effects and interest rate controls 
Inequality  0.176 0.051 -0.07  0.15 -0.236  0.133 
  [0.178] [0.261] [0.105] [0.359] [0.340] [0.589] 
Observations  501  547 94 104 46  51 
R-squared  0.7  0.71 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.82 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All specifications include controls for current and lagged real income 
per capita, and the current and lagged dependency ratio. Interest rate controls are the rate of return on bonds in 
local currency, in both the current period and the lagged period. 
 
Although the specifications in Table 1 cover a long span of years, they have the disadvantage 
that the countries in our sample were subject to a number of major shocks over this period. 
The aftermath of World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, and the post-war 
rebuilding might all have affected both inequality and savings. We therefore restrict the 
specification to 1960 onwards, on the basis that macroeconomic conditions over this period 
were more stable, and those shocks that did occur (e.g. world economic cycles) tended to be 
common to all countries, and will therefore be largely captured by year fixed effects.  
 
The results from the period from 1960 onwards are shown in Table 2. Again, we begin by 
showing a pooled OLS specification (Panel A), which shows a negative relationship between 
inequality and savings, though not as large as in the full sample, and generally not 
statistically significant.  In Panels B and C, we add country and year fixed effects. The results  13
are very similar to the results for the full sample, with none of the coefficients on the savings 
rate being statistically significant. This suggests that the results in Table 1 are not driven 
merely by the inclusion of data from the interwar and immediate post-World War II era.  
 
For expositional simplicity, the coefficients on the time-varying country controls (national 
income, the dependency ratio, and the return on bonds) are not shown. In most cases, they are 
statistically insignificant. We also estimate the linear sum of the current and lagged controls 
(results not shown), which was negative and statistically insignificant in most specifications.  
 
Table 2:  Inequality and Savings, 1960-2002 
Dependent variable is the gross national savings rate 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lag: T-1 T-5 T-10 
Measure:  Top 10%  Top 1%  Top 10% Top 1%  Top 10%  Top 1% 
Panel A: Without country and year fixed effects 
Inequality  -0.268*  -0.222 -0.235 -0.239 -0.171 -0.082 
  [0.120] [0.193] [0.132] [0.232] [0.116] [0.282] 
Observations  352  354  70 71 38 39 
R-squared  0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Panel B: With fixed effects, without interest rate controls 
Inequality  0.062 -0.129 -0.061 -0.266 0.028  0.035 
  [0.141] [0.202] [0.158] [0.261] [0.306] [0.504] 
Observations  352  354  70 71 38 39 
R-squared  0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 
Panel C: With fixed effects and interest rate controls 
Inequality  0.059 -0.127 -0.08 -0.237  -0.048 0.039 
  [0.143] [0.204] [0.167] [0.301] [0.440] [0.632] 
Observations  352  354  70 71 38 39 
R-squared  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All specifications include controls for current and lagged real income 
per capita, and the current and lagged dependency ratio. Interest rate controls are the rate of return on bonds in 
local currency, in both the current period and the lagged period. 
 
An important question about our results is whether they are insignificant because the 
estimated effect is close to zero, or merely because of measurement error. In more colloquial 
terms, one might ask: is our estimate zero, or very zero? A natural way to answer this 
question is to focus not only on our point estimates, but also on their associated standard  14
errors. Our preferred estimates are those that use the top 10 percent share with annual data, 
and controlling for the return on bonds. (The top 10 percent share is our preferred estimate 
because it encompasses what we regard as ‘the rich’ in a given society; by contrast, we think 
of the top 1 percent as ‘the elite’.)  Over the full sample (Table 1, Column 1, Panel C), the 
point estimate is 0.176, suggesting that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of the 
richest 10 percent would raise national savings by 0.18 percentage points. The 95 percent 
confidence interval on this estimate ranges from -0.22 to 0.57. Across the full sample, the 
standard deviation of the top 10 percent share is 5 percentage points. Our estimates therefore 
imply that a one standard deviation increase in the top 10 percent share (about the increase in 
the United States during the 1990s) would have increased national savings by a statistically 
insignificant 1 percentage point, with a 95 percent confidence interval from -1 percentage 
point to +3 percentage points. Across the full sample, the standard deviation of the savings 
rate is 6 percentage points. Our results are therefore consistent with no more than small 
negative effects or modest positive effects of inequality on savings.  
 
If we perform the same exercise using the estimate from 1960 onwards, the results are quite 
similar. In Panel D, Column 1, the point estimate is 0.059, suggesting that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the share of the richest 10 percent would raise national savings by 0.06 
percentage points. The 95 percent confidence interval on this estimate is from -0.26 to 0.38. 
This implies that a one standard deviation increase in the top 10 percent share would have 
increased national savings by a statistically insignificant 1 percentage point, with a 95 
percent confidence interval from -1 percentage point to +2 percentage points. Again, this 
allows us to reject, at the 95 percent level of significance, economically large effects of top 
income inequality on savings rates. Overall, our results are consistent with the fixed effects 
framework in Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000). Moreover, the results in Table 2 allow us  15
to (just) rule out effects as large as those in Cook (1995), who found that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the income share of the richest ten percent was associated with a 0.4 percentage 
points increase in the savings rate.  
 
4. Robustness Checks 
 
We perform a number of robustness checks, beginning in Table 3 with tests of functional 
form and additional covariates.
4 First, to account for the possibility that inequality may have 
a non-linear impact on savings, Panel A shows results including both the top income share 
and its square. Second, while the previous results control for the interest rate (in Panel C of 
Tables 1 and 2), it may also be the case that the degree of development of the local credit 
markets may affect savings patterns. In Panel B of Table 3, we therefore add a control for a 
proxy for credit market depth: the ratio of domestic credit to GDP. Third, while our main 
specifications control for the dependency ratio, it may also be the case that government 
pension schemes affect savings patterns. Panel C of Table 3 therefore controls for two 
variables relating to public pensions: the support ratio, and the effective contribution rates to 
public pension programs. These additional variables are defined in the Data Appendix. Note 
that in the case of both credit market depth and public pension programs, there is a possibility 
that these variables are themselves endogenous with respect to the savings rate, so these 
specifications are not our preferred estimates. For simplicity, the results in Table 3 are 
presented only for the years 1960-2002. All include country and year fixed effects, and a 
control for the interest rate.   
 
                                                 
4 In the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries, the rise in top incomes was greater in English-speaking 
countries than in non-English-speaking countries (Piketty and Saez, 2006a; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Leigh, 
2009). We therefore carried out a further robustness check, in which we re-estimated the regressions separately 
for English-speaking and non-English-speaking countries. We did not find a consistent relationship between 
savings and inequality in either subset of countries.  16
None of the robustness checks in Table 3 appears to have a substantial impact on our main 
results, with the inequality coefficient (and its square, where applicable) being statistically 
insignificant in all specifications. Notably, the standard errors are also quite similar when 
domestic credit and public pension variables are added to the regression. However, adding a 
quadratic in inequality causes the standard errors to increase substantially, and we can no 
longer reject economically meaningful effects of inequality on savings.  
  
Table 3: Inequality and Savings: Robustness Checks  
Sample is 1960-2002 
Dependent variable is the gross national savings rate 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lag: T-1 T-5 T-10 
Measure:  Top 10%  Top 1%  Top 10% Top 1%  Top 10%  Top 1% 
Panel A: Including a quadratic in inequality 
Inequality  0.079 -0.799 -1.155 -1.659 0.736 -2.782 
  [0.737] [0.759] [0.739] [1.093] [4.815] [4.205] 
Inequality
2 -0.029 3.38 1.607 7.552  -1.192  15.338 
  [0.976] [3.269] [1.096] [4.884] [6.857]  [20.045] 
Observations  352  354  70 71 38 39 
R-squared  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.85 
Panel B: Controlling for credit market depth 
Inequality  0.047 -0.193 -0.093 -0.326  -0.09  -0.054 
  [0.129] [0.200] [0.161] [0.309] [0.475] [0.774] 
Observations  352  354  70 71 38 39 
R-squared  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.84 
Panel C: Controlling for public pension arrangements 
Inequality  -0.034 -0.245 -0.112 -0.217 0.031  0.275 
  [0.175] [0.181] [0.115] [0.219] [0.437] [0.537] 
Observations  352  354  70 71 38 39 
R-squared  0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.86 
Note: All specifications include country and year fixed effects, and interest rate controls. Standard errors, 
clustered at the country level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. All specifications include controls for current and lagged real income per capita, and the 
current and lagged dependency ratio. Interest rate controls are the rate of return on bonds in local currency, in 
both the current period and the lagged period. Credit market depth is the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, in 
both the current period and the lagged period. Public pension arrangements are the support ratio, and the 
effective contribution rates to public pension programs, in both the current period and the lagged period. 
 
Since our primary specifications are based on national saving rates (which include 
government savings), it is possible that the null results are due to inequality having offsetting 
effects on household and government savings rates. For example, suppose that inequality has  17
a first-order effect of increasing government savings, but no first-order impact on household 
savings. If the Ricardian equivalence theorem holds (Barro, 1974, 1989), then the rise in 
government savings will cause households to reduce private savings, leaving aggregate 
national savings unchanged.   
 
Conversely, suppose that inequality has a first-order effect of increasing household savings 
(e.g. because the rich save more than the poor), but no first-order effect on government 
savings. Observing the growing disparity in retirement wealth, the government might choose 
to reduce government savings in order to increase expenditure on pensions for poor retirees 
(akin to the model in Alesina and Rodrik, 1996). In this second example, the fall in 
government savings would offset the rise in private savings, leaving national savings 
unchanged.  
 
To address this problem, we look at the impact of top income shares on the household 
savings rate. Although data on household savings data are only available for the years 1975-
2002, it is nonetheless instructive to see whether our results are robust to switching the 
dependent variable from the gross savings rate to the household savings rate over this period. 
This necessitates a substantial reduction in sample size, not merely because we have data on 
both inequality and household savings only for the period 1975-2002, but also because we 
are unable to obtain household savings data for Ireland. More detail on our household 
savings series is provided in the Data Appendix. 
 
Table 4 shows this relationship, first without country and year fixed effects, then with fixed 
effects but no interest rate control, and then with both fixed effects and the interest rate 
control. Although the number of observations is substantially smaller, the results in Table 4  18
generally support the above conclusions using gross savings as the dependent variable. 
However, the 95 percent confidence interval is slightly larger. For example, according to 
Table 4, Column 1, Panel C, a 1 percentage point increase in the previous year’s top 10 
percent share lowers the household savings rate by 0.126 percentage points (with a 95 
percent confidence interval ranging from -0.851 to 0.599). Since the standard deviation of the 
top 10 percent share is 5 percentage points, and the standard deviation of the household 
savings rate is 4 percentage points, this suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the 
top 10 percent share would have an effect on the household savings rate of between -1 
standard deviations and +2/3 standard deviations. This range encompasses economically 
meaningful impacts; but again, the results are not statistically significant. Given that the point 
estimates are close to zero, the estimates in Table 4 suggest that top income inequality does 
not affect household savings. These results also provide some reassurance that the absence of 
a relationship between inequality and national savings (Tables 1-3) is not merely due to 
offsetting shifts in household savings and government savings.   19
 
Table 4: Inequality and Household Savings, 1975-2002 
Dependent variable is the household savings rate 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lag: T-1 T-5 T-10 
Measure:  Top 10%  Top 1%  Top 10% Top 1%  Top 10%  Top 1% 
Panel A: Without country and year fixed effects 
Inequality  0.041 -0.002 0.04  0.044 0.196 0.279 
  [0.141] [0.291] [0.139] [0.236] [0.170] [0.278] 
Observations  230  230  48 48 24 24 
R-squared  0.46 0.46 0.59 0.59 0.67 0.66 
Panel B: With fixed effects, without interest rate controls 
Inequality  -0.121 -0.178 0.022 -0.472 0.434 -0.279 
  [0.318] [0.455] [0.260] [0.541] [0.574] [0.989] 
Observations  230  230  48 48 24 24 
R-squared  0.74 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.88 0.87 
Panel C: With fixed effects and interest rate controls 
Inequality  -0.126 -0.162 -0.138 -0.486 0.502  0.96 
  [0.321] [0.467] [0.233] [0.521] [0.691] [1.715] 
Observations  230  230  48 48 24 24 
R-squared  0.74 0.74 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.89 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All specifications include controls for current and lagged real income 
per capita, and the current and lagged dependency ratio. Interest rate controls are the rate of return on bonds in 




Using top incomes data, we revisit the impact of inequality on savings rates. By comparison 
with previous studies, our panel covers a small number of countries, but a long span of years. 
By including country fixed effects, we are able to account for the possibility that certain 
time-specific shocks affect both inequality and savings simultaneously. Without country and 
year fixed effects, we observe a negative correlation between past inequality and current 
savings rates. But in our (preferred) fixed effects specifications, we find no statistically 
significant effect of inequality on savings. Our results are not only statistically insignificant; 
they are also economically small, with standard errors in the fixed effects specifications that 
are tight enough to rule out more than modest impacts in either direction. The results are  20
robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, including GDP per capita, the dependency 
ratio, and proxies for the interest rate, credit market depth, and public pension arrangements.  
 
However, we must be careful not to draw conclusions that go beyond the limits of our data. 
Since our primary specifications are based on national saving rates (which include 
government savings), it is possible that our null result is due to inequality having offsetting 
effects on household and government savings rates. To address this problem, we re-estimate 
our models using household savings data for recent decades. We find no statistically 
significant relationship between household savings and top incomes, though the standard 
errors on our household savings estimates are sufficiently large that we cannot entirely rule 
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Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
Gross national savings 
rate 
547 0.197 0.059 -0.044 0.352
Top 1% share  547 0.099 0.031 0.036  0.196
Top 10% share  501 0.338 0.049 0.217  0.466
Log real GDP per capita  547 9.276 0.523 7.792  10.259
Dependency ratio  547 0.538 0.061 0.426  0.713
Rate of return on bonds  547 0.038 0.114 -0.307  0.625
Credit market depth  434 0.701 0.326 0.282  1.793
Support ratio  434 2.540 0.305 1.980  3.200
Effective pension 
contribution rate  434 0.193 0.073 0.073  0.450
Household savings rate  230 0.098 0.040 -0.030  0.179
50/10 ratio (LIS)  227 2.039 0.358 0.564  2.806




Variables used in main specifications 
 
Top incomes 
Top incomes data are from Leigh (2007), who adjusts top incomes series from 13 different 
papers to produce a comparable data set, estimated on a calendar-year basis. Note that in 
Australia, Canada, and Spain, the tax unit is the individual throughout the period of analysis, 
while in France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States, the tax unit is a 
married couple or single individuals throughout the analysis. Germany has a hybrid system, 
with most taxpayers filing as tax units, and the very rich filing as individuals. Sweden and the 
United Kingdom both switched from household to individual filing. Where this appears to 
have caused substantial breaks in continuity, Leigh (2007) adjusts the top incomes series to 
take account of the changes. We exclude Japan, since top 10 percent estimates are not 
available for that country; and New Zealand, since historical data on bond returns are 
unavailable. 
 
Gross Savings  
Our savings data are comprised of two data sources: Taylor (2002) and OECD Economic 
Outlook (2006). From 1921-92 we use savings data from Taylor (2002), who estimated 
savings rates over the period 1870-1992 for Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. We employ his data from 1921-92 for Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States due to superior data availability. Taylor’s data sources and definitions are as follows: 
From 1915-59, the savings rate is calculated via the current account identity, as the 
investment rate plus the ratio of the current account to GDP. This data is taken by Taylor 
from Mitchell (1983, 1992), using his national income and overall current balance series at 
current prices. The overall current balance series are converted from U.S. dollars, using his 
exchange rate series as necessary. From 1960-92, Taylor’s estimates of GDP and gross 
domestic saving at current prices are taken from World Bank (1994). 
 
From 1993-2002 estimates of gross national savings as a percent of GDP are taken from 
Annex Table 24 of the OECD Economic Outlook (2006). Gross national savings is defined 
by the OECD simply as gross national income less consumption (private and public).  
 
Overall, the Taylor and OECD data sources are very close to one another. Over the years that 
we have data from both sources (1986-92), we estimated the mean absolute differences 
between the two. These differences ranged from 0.003 percentage points (the U.K.) to 0.01 
percentage points (Germany) with an average of 0.0074 percentage points.  
 
GDP 
GDP is real GDP per capita (measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars), from 
Maddison (2003, 2007).  
 
Interest rate 
We use the total return on bonds (%) in local currency, sourced from the “Dimson-Marsh-
Staunton Global/Returns Database”, maintained by Ibbotson Associates (updated to 
December 2002). The series are described in more detail in Dimson et al. (2002), which 
includes tables on a ten-year basis, and a graph of the annual data.   27
Dependency ratios 
We follow the definition set by the United Nations Population Division 
(http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm) and define the total dependency ratio as the 
ratio of the sum of the population aged 0-14 and that aged 65+ to the population aged 15-64. 
These population figures are obtained from the Human Mortality Database, maintained by 
the University of California, Berkeley and the Max Planck Institute for Demographic 
Research.  The data are available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de. The data 
were downloaded on August 29, 2007. 
 
Treatment of Germany 
All series for Germany are for West Germany for 1956-91, and for reunified Germany from 
1992 onwards. 
 
Variables used in robustness checks 
 
Credit market depth 
Following Bailliu and Reisen (1997), we proxy credit market depth with a measure of 
domestic credit claims on the private sector as a proportion of GDP. Domestic credit data is 
taken from the International Financial Statistics, Line 32d (IMF, Various Years). For most 
countries in our sample, these data are available for the period 1950-2002. Where there are 
gaps in the data, we interpolate linearly. Where data are missing at the beginning or end of 
the sample, we use the earliest or latest observation, as applicable. GDP data are from OECD 
National Accounts.   
 
Public pension arrangements 
We control for two proxies for a country’s public pension arrangements: the support ratio and 
effective contribution rates to public pension programs. These are taken from Disney (2006), 
who describes the variables as follows. 
 
Support ratio: “ILO data on activity rates gives the ratio of actual workers aged 15–
59 to people aged over 60. To convert this ratio into an effective support ratio, I make 
a couple of additional assumptions. First, I remove all workers aged under 20 and 
over 60, on the  rounds that their contribution to total contribution revenue is likely to 
be low (low incomes and/or low hours). Secondly, it should not be assumed that all 
people over 60 receive a pension from the public programme … most countries have 
a contribution requirement underpinning eligibility for benefits. As an approximation, 
I take all men as eligible for a pension, and the proportion of women eligible as 
equivalent to the highest rate of participation observed in each decade’s cross-section 
of participation rates for women. So, for example, if the highest 5-year age band 
participation rate is 70 per cent, I assume that this percentage will receive a full 
pension. Since noncontributors are generally entitled to some benefits, especially 
widows (and widowers without their own pension rights), I use information on rights 
to survivors benefits (which varies across these countries from 0 per cent to 100 per 
cent of the original award) from the US Public Pension Administration’s Survey of 
country pension programmes.” (Disney 2006) 
 
Effective contribution rates to public pensions: “These are the average expected 
gross public pension replacement rates … They are stylised indicators of what a 55 
year old at each date could expect, in terms of public pension benefits relative to 
earned income at retirement, if that individual started work at age 20 … By  28
interpolation (with adjustments where pension reforms seem to have had significant 
impacts, as in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s) and by extrapolation to the mid-
1950s, I have used these data to construct mid-decade estimates of expected 
replacement rates for a 55 year old in 1955, 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995” (Disney 
2006) 
 
Disney (2006) provides data for both variables for the years 1955, 1965, 1975, 1985 and 
1995. We linearly interpolate between these years, and assume that the figures for 1950-54 
are the same as 1955, and the figures for 1996-2002 are the same as 1995.  
 
Household savings rates 
For 1986-2002, these are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook (2006), Annex Table 23, 
and represent the ratio of household savings to household disposable income. The OECD 
notes that most countries report household savings on a net basis (i.e. excluding consumption 
of fixed capital by households and unincorporated businesses). However, the data for Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. include savings by non-profit institutions (the OECD 
refers to these four countries’ series as “gross savings”). The OECD does not report 
household savings data for Ireland. 
 
From 1975-1985, we use data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, as 
used in Callen and Thimann (1997), and kindly provided to us by Tim Callen. This gives the 
ratio of household savings to GDP. Unfortunately, there appear to be a number of major 
discrepancies between the IMF and OECD series. Since the IMF series is expressed as a ratio 
of GDP, and the OECD series is expressed as a ratio of household disposable income (which 
is typically around two-thirds of GDP), the IMF household savings rate should be lower. 
However, for some countries, the IMF savings rate in 1985 is considerably higher than the 
OECD savings rate in 1986. For example, the 1985 and 1986 figures for Australia are 18.5% 
and 10.3% respectively, while the figures for France are 15.0% and 8.1%. It seems 
improbable that the savings rate in these two countries fell so substantially (particularly if the 
1985 figure is adjusted upwards by a factor of 1.5). We therefore adopt a more conservative 
approach, and scale the 1975-1985 figures so that the savings rates in 1985 and 1986 are the 
same. In effect, this allows us to exploit the changes from 1975-1985, but standardizes the 
levels to match the OECD series.   
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Robustness Appendix: Obtaining Inequality Measures from the Luxembourg Income 
Study 
 
To take into account the possibility that our results may be capturing something specific to 
top income inequality, we also estimated the models using measures of inequality from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The data in LIS are designed to be as comparable as 
possible, with all estimates based upon equivalized post-tax household incomes. So far as we 
are aware, no previous study has used the LIS data to look at the relationship between 
savings and inequality, so our results are novel to this extent. But our main focus is on 
whether the coefficient on inequality appears to be different when we use a measure of 
inequality at the top of the distribution (the 90/50 ratio) or a measure of inequality at the 
bottom of the distribution (the 50/10 ratio).  
 
Our LIS data cover the period 1970-2002. To maintain comparability with the previous 
results, we restrict the sample to the 11 countries covered by this study. In order that we may 
estimate fixed effects models, we impute values for missing years, using inequality figures 
up to 3 years before or afterwards. Even so, we do not have sufficient country-year 
observations to estimate models with both fixed effects and ten year lags. 
 
The LIS results are shown in Appendix Table 2.  Without country and year fixed effects 
(Panel A), we find that both measures of inequality have a negative impact on the savings 
rate. This is consistent with our results for top income shares, though it is only statistically 
significant for the 50/10 ratio with a ten-year lag. Once country and year fixed effects are 
added to the regressions (Panel B), the coefficients become small and mostly insignificant. 
The same is true when controlling for the interest rate (Panel C). The exception is the 
coefficient on the 50/10 ratio with a one-year lag, which is significant at the 10 percent level. 
The coefficient on this estimate is 0.010 (regardless of whether we control for the interest 
rate). Since the standard deviation of the 50/10 ratio in this sample is 0.35, this suggests that 
a one standard deviation increase in the 50/10 ratio would lead to a 3.5 percentage point 
increase in the savings rate, or about two-thirds of a standard deviation increase in savings. 
Overall, we regard the results from Appendix Table 2 as suggesting that although the effects 
of bottom-end inequality on savings may be slightly stronger than the effect of top-end 
inequality on savings, neither effect is particularly strong. 
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Appendix Table 2: Robustness Check – Using LIS Inequality Data 
Sample is 1970-2002 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lag: T-1 T-5 T-10 
Measure:  50/10 90/50 50/10 90/50 50/10 90/50 
Panel A: Without country and year fixed effects, without interest rate control 
Inequality  -0.037 -0.022 -0.042 -0.017  -0.105**  -0.066 
  [0.021] [0.025] [0.024] [0.019] [0.041] [0.101] 
Observations  235  235  40 40 18 18 
R-squared  0.29 0.21 0.32 0.21 0.48 0.23 
Panel B: With fixed effects, without interest rate controls 
Inequality 0.010*  0.003  0.002  -0.007  N/A N/A 
  [0.005] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008]     
Observations 235  235  40  40     
R-squared 0.91 0.9 0.94  0.94     
Panel C: With fixed effects and interest rate controls 
Inequality 0.010*  0.003  0.007  -0.005  N/A N/A 
  [0.005] [0.006] [0.018] [0.010]     
Observations 235  235  40  40     
R-squared  0.91 0.91 0.94 0.94     
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Inequality is measured as the 50/10 or the 90/50 ratio. All 
specifications include controls for current and lagged real income per capita, and the current and lagged 
dependency ratio. Interest rate control is the rate of return on bonds in local currency, in both the current period 
and the lagged period. 
 
 